| |
The Little Hoover Commission of California aims
at successfully integrating immigrants into the state, reducing
their exploitation and dependence, and harnessing their talents
for the state's benefit. In 2001 Assistant Professor of Public Policy
Studies at Duke University Noah M. Pickus testified before the commission
about the failure of California's integration policies in the early
20th century. According to Pickus, the failure partially stemmed
from the coercive policies of the teens and twenties. Forged in
a national context, Pickus' answer is apt.
However, as a method to teach immigrants their rights
and advocate for them, Americanization developed in California during
these years in a more complex manner than Pickus allows. In 1910
the U.S. census reported that over half of Californians or their
children were immigrants. The state responded to this fact and the
related need to make immigrants feel a part of the American fabric.
In California Americanization was many sided. It opposed disruptive
unionism, but was culturally liberal in many respects. If initially
skeptical about the prospects of incorporating Mexican and Asian
immigrants, it was more inclusive of Southeastern European immigrants
than the tenor of the time encouraged. It was strikingly anti-employer
when employers' actions threatened industrial peace, and unusually
careful in teaching immigrants their rights and duties as well as
teaching native-born Americans their obligations to potential citizens.1
While not synonymous with ours, the times likewise
undulated with prosperity and war with its attendant boom followed
by recession and depression. In general a number of external currents
influenced Americanization during the teens and twenties: the Progressive
movement with its faith in reshaping society through state intervention;
World War I and its call for patriotism, one hundred per cent Americanism,
and fear of all things foreign, particularly German; and the Red
Scare, which raised its head with the 1917 Bolshevik victory over
the Russian monarchy, intensifying the fear of foreign influences.
Each of these currents affected California in the realm of Americanization,
although not always in the way dictated in studies of the Progressive
movement or Americanization, which often focus on New York as the
trendsetter in immigrant policy of the time.
Progressive Influences
Among national debates that raged from the 19th into the 20th century
and were reignited in Congress after the assassination of President
McKinley by the son of Southeastern European immigrants was the
question of whether to exclude immigrants and if so, which ones,
based on the racial thinking of the era. A series of reforms enlarged
the categories of immigrants that were excludable. At the same time
other reformers emerged to champion what they called a domestic
immigration policy and what many reformers now refer to as immigrant
policy. This policy argued that the best way to deal with immigrant
unrest was to effectively integrate new comers into American life,
educate them about their rights, and eliminate un-American exploitation
that might lead such immigrants to rebel. This domestic immigration
policy movement was adopted between the teens and twenties in five
states, which contained over half of the country's population of
immigrants and their children. In these states - New York, Illinois,
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and California - reformers successfully
established agencies that worked to Americanize their residents,
both immigrant and native-born, and to eliminate the exploitation
beneath immigrant unrest. Trailing New York by a few years, California
was the second state to adopt an Americanization policy. Oriented
toward cultural pluralism, it was one of the most respectful of
immigrant differences for the time.
 |
|
|
California received its Commission of Immigration
in Housing (CCIH) in 1913, as a result of the lobbying of a second-generation
immigrant, Simon J. Lubin, who emphasized the fact that California
was likely to receive an additional influx of Southeastern European
immigrants in 1914 when the Panama Canal opened. Four departments
- an Americanization department focusing on educating immigrants
in civics, a complaint department, a migrant labor camp department,
and a housing department worked together to facilitate immigrant
Americanization. Under Lubin and his fellow commissioners' auspices,
Americanization took on a unique form. Progressing from a harsher,
more racialist view under Amanda Matthews Chase, CCIH programs assumed
a softer tone under Lubin, Christina Krysto, and Ethel Richardson,
even as Americans faced increasing challenges from abroad.
As an organization CCIH perceived Americanization
not as a one way but a two way process in which both immigrants
and their native-born neighbors were expected to learn and act upon
the fundamental principals of citizenship. These principles involved
learning not only one's duties to the nation, but also one's rights;
and actively working to extend those rights to others in order to
reduce destabilizing and costly discontent. While the main beneficiaries
of this program were doubtless intended to be Southeastern Europeans,
and members of the commission left some very unpleasant remarks
about Asian and Mexican Americans on the historical register, both
visual and textual evidence contradicts commonly invoked assumptions
about the state's neglectful attitude towards the integration of
Asian and Mexican American minorities. California's Americanization
program involved all of the above groups and sought to enhance the
efficiency, productivity, and harmony of the state, as well as America's
image abroad. It did so through the influence of a small state bureaucracy
that engaged a broader civil society's voluntary organizations in
the service of encouraging Americans to live up to the principles
upon which the country was founded and teach all immigrants those
principles.
World War I
World War I intensified a fear that immigrants from the Axis powers,
Japan or Mexico might foment sabotage in the United States. California,
carved out of Mexico in 1848, shares a border with Mexico. This
together with concern that Germany would aid the Mexican government
retake its lost territories set Southwesterners on edge. In response
to this situation California's CCIH continued advocating a sympathetic
Americanization policy, but combined it with spying on the Industrial
Workers of the World (IWW), which led to a more repressive, yet
not employer-captive policy.
 |
|
|
CCIH concern over IWW and a distrust of foreign
laborers, particularly Japanese and Mexicans, is reflected in its
1918 call for the establishment of permanent community labor camps.
CCIH community camp policy appeared only in 1918, a year after American
entry into the war and came under the direct influence of a number
of reports by its investigators. One such report by J.V. Thompson
aroused fear regarding the proposed German, Japanese, and Mexican
alliance. The report called for employer housing to eliminate the
congregation of certain races outside their employer's surveillance
and to limit the mobility of saboteurs. The proximity of Japanese
laborers to some of California's best beet and fruit ranches was
seen as an important threat to California's fruit industry. J.V.
Thompson noted that Japanese and Mexican laborers scattered around
various California counties "constitute[d] a menace...worthy of
observance;" and Mexican cowboys and laborers at the Miller and
Lux Company near Guadalupe, had "roundly cursed" President Woodrow
Wilson when they heard that the United States had recognized the
Carranza faction in Mexico.2
Thompson suggested eliminating IWW power in a multi-fold
way. He strove to get rid of the organization's headquarters, alleviate
labor camp conditions and prevent the mobility of laborers as well
as easy access to materials for sabotage. He urged employers "to
furnish transportation, and proper accommodations to their employees"
so that they might be kept under constant surveillance.3
Additional calls for internment fell on deaf ears. The federal government,
judging internment beyond existing legal avenues, favored a plan
that relied "entirely on legal actions...On September 5, 1917 Justice
Department agents and police officials invaded IWW homes and halls
across the nation and seized everything that they could find." Trials
were held in Fresno and Sacramento, California.4 The
raids did not stop IWW organizing in agriculture, copper mining,
lumber and other industries, and CCIH sent Thompson to investigate
the Redwood Empire's lumber industry in 1918.5
CCIH efforts against IWW might suggest that CCIH
was, in fact, captive to industry during the war. Tragically IWW
was one of the few unions that offered a voice for the unskilled
trades in which immigrants tended to congregate. However, it is
important to recognize that CCIH actions during the war were aimed
not against unionism, but violence. As William Preston, the author
of a history critical of the government's repression of IWW during
and immediately after WWI, points out, it is one thing to defend
civil liberties in free speech, another "to accept the continuous
violent action of the IWW's at the point of production."6
Like the Progressives, CCIH staff and commissioners distrusted the
organized economic power of corporations. Reflecting these two tendencies,
CCIH called both for the suppression of IWW and the vigilantism
practiced by corporations by placing repression in federal hands
Beyond rhetoric, visual representations of CCIH
work suggest as much. Its labor camp department actively arrested
labor camp operators, especially as the war years waned and the
incentive for employers to follow CCIH proscriptions decreased.
Inspectors were sent into the field and a complaint department was
established that encouraged immigrant and migrant laborers to take
responsibility for their own living and working conditions ( Figure
1). The commission displayed an openness to sponsoring Americanization
classes under the auspices of any interested organization, including
the Garment Workers Union (Figure 2).
The Red Scare
While World War I raised the prospect of German, Japanese and Mexican
saboteurs, events in Russia during 1917 intensified Americans' sense
of vulnerability. That year, the Bolsheviks defeated the czars,
installing the world's first socialist government in one of the
least likely places. Insecure Americans began to see the threat
of Bolshevism in labor strikes and elsewhere. Unscrupulous opponents
of Progressive reform latched onto the general fear of the American
public as a way to attack social reforms, often successfully, parading
their destruction of Progressive policies as the triumph of Americanism.
Proponents of one type of Americanism (progressive, pluralistic)
battled it out with proponents of another (conservative, intensely
nationalistic, and committed to molding all into one culture). In
this combination of World War I and Red Scare-induced battles, CCIH,
like many other Progressive era agencies and reforms, was accused
of communist sympathies as illustrated in the election campaign
of California Governor Friend W. Richardson and the allegations
of the Better America Federation.
 |
|
|
Tension over World War I renewed conservatism in
state and national affairs and in 1919 California passed a criminal
syndicalism law. Equally symptomatic of the backlash, but more induced
by the Red Scare, was the establishment of the Better America Federation
(BAF) in May 1920. As Edwin Layton shows, this reactionary organization
assaulted Progressive legislation - from higher taxes on banks and
utilities to the open shop to the eradication of all state regulatory
boards and commissions including CCIH. BAF accused its opponents
of treason and subversion, and specifically targeted Commissioner
and founder, Simon Lubin, and labor leader and Commissioner Paul
Scharrenberg. Meanwhile, the realignment of political parties in
California touted a business ideology that emphasized corporate
organization and efficiency as opposed to the social agencies' agendas.
This new administrative conservatism became institutionalized by
the 1923 election of Richardson as California's governor.7
BAF represents one of the earliest external challenges
to CCIH. As Edwin Layton notes, BAF campaigned to destroy many of
the Progressives' achievements using the same methods that Americanizers
employed during the war.8 Although CCIH ultimately discredited
BAF by exposing its private utility interest background, Lubin and
Scharrenberg were damaged by the assaults.9The militant
nationalism of World War I and the Red Scare encouraged BAF to use
Americanization rhetoric to discredit its opponents.10
For example, BAF accused Lubin and the commission of assisting the
IWW 11. It attacked Scharrenberg for drawing money from
CCIH while lobbying for anti-injunction bills that increased labor
unions' power in strikes.12 These attacks came at a vulnerable
moment in CCIH history.
Influenced by the Red Scare and the tarring of CCIH
with the taint of Communism, CCIH and the State Board of Education,
whose main Americanization program developer had been trained in
CCIH, took the offensive, promoting the need for Americanization
programs for immigrants and their extension to native-born Americans
throughout California. Indeed, in this volatile climate, CCIH actually
moved considerably to the left of Liberal Americanizers. Its proactive
approach to the challenges posed by the Red Scare was evident as
early as 1919. In 1919 and 1920, a series of articles entitled "The
Strength of the Nation" co-authored by commissioner Lubin and staff
member Christina Krysto appeared in The Survey.13 These
articles refuted the contemporary feeling that the melting pot was
not working, called for a federal department of nation building
with bureaus for the Americanization of both foreign-born and native-born
citizens, and reaffirmed CCIH belief that America's strength derived
from its power to take the talents of immigrants and "while preserving
their national core, to transmute them into a new thing that is
essentially American."14
These articles placed novel emphasis on how the
treatment of immigrants influenced America's international image.
Americans were told that "when one section of the population is
a ready victim to exploitation, the moral tone of the whole land
is lowered."15 They were warned that the returned immigrant
became an example of American life to the homeland. "Returned emigrants
corrupted by the country they have visited, weakened by excessive
labor, impoverished by adverse industrial conditions, embittered
by a series of failures," would be "a burden to the home community
and a menace to the entire homeland"16, hardly likely
to project a good image of America (Figure 3).
CCIH 1921 Annual Report argued "that Americanization
was not flag-raising and 'patriotic' howling; it was not suppression
of speech and honest opinion; it was more than teaching English
to foreigners" and involved the "Americanization" of Americans,
developing national ideals and standards in which "all residents,
foreign-born as well as native-born" would be schooled, especially
through community participation.17 CCIH launched a community
organization campaign in 1920 and 1921 insisting that Americans
should "be [their] own Americanizers"!18 Two posters
that appeared in its Bulletin clearly conveyed to social workers
and readers in general that instead of complaining about immigrants
as radical, unassimilated elements Americans ought to offer their
services to the state to solve the so-called problem (Figure 4).
Americanization was equated with raising all residents (whether
foreign or native-born) to a certain standard of living.
After World War I, CCIH continued to emphasize its
belief that immigrant cultures provided the best materials out of
which to build citizens. Moreover, while California's conservatives
won the immediate election, they lost the long-term battle. The
slashing of CCIH budgets by Governor Richardson was quickly reversed
when the governor became inundated by testimony about CCIH benefits
to the state from women's clubs, employers, and immigrant leaders.
Surely, in California during the teens and twenties,
Americanization was not about one hundred per cent Anglo-conformity
or teaching immigrants to accept a status quo that endangered the
industrial safety, health, and well-being of individuals and the
community at large. CCIH opposition to total Americanism influenced
the State Department of Education, which assumed responsibility
for immigrant education in 1920, along with its branch, the Bureau
of Immigrant Education (BIE) in California's Department of Adult
Education. The fact that Ethel Richardson, former Director of CCIH
Bureau of Immigrant Education served on all three of these bodies,
makes clear why this occurred.19 During the late 1920s,
BIE, which furnished the most material used in immigrant education
throughout the state, resisted demands for immigrant conformity.20
A 1925 BIE Community Exchange Bulletin proclaims that the "purpose
of the home teacher...is not to encourage the alien to forget his
native culture."21
 |
|
|
By the beginning of the Depression an uneven reversal
was underway. Those who experienced Americanization during that
era, particularly Mexican Americans, remember Americanization in
a harsher mode. Asian Americans, particularly Japanese Americans,
then subject to exclusion, found themselves subject to greater inclusion
at the same time.22 The decline in immigration and rise
in native-born children who were automatically American citizens
intensified the need to educate Asian immigrants, even though they
were denied the opportunity to naturalize. CCIH classes involving
Japanese Americans suggest this shift (Figure 5).
The advent of World War II and a bifurcated policy
that incarcerated Japanese Americans while embracing Chinese and
Filipino Americans starkly interrupted CCIH activity. Americanization
ultimately disappeared as a state policy in 1945, when CCIH immigrant
protective functions were abolished. Some fifty years later the
Little Hoover Commission reinvestigates this complex precedent as
one of a number of policies that might facilitate immigrant integration
in California for mutual benefit.
Notes>>
|
|