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The Little Hoover Commission of California aims at successfully
integrating immigrants into the state, reducing their exploitation and
dependence, and harnessing their talents for the state's benefit. In 2001
Assistant Professor of Public Policy Studies at Duke University Noah M.
Pickus testified before the commission about the failure of California's
integration policies in the early 20th century. According to Pickus, the
failure partially stemmed from the coercive policies of the teens and
twenties. Forged in a national context, Pickus' answer is apt.
However, as a method to teach immigrants their rights
and advocate for them, Americanization developed in California during
these years in a more complex manner than Pickus allows. In 1910 the U.S.
census reported that over half of Californians or their children were
immigrants. The state responded to this fact and the related need to make
immigrants feel a part of the American fabric. In California Americanization
was many sided. It opposed disruptive unionism, but was culturally liberal
in many respects. If initially skeptical about the prospects of incorporating
Mexican and Asian immigrants, it was more inclusive of Southeastern European
immigrants than the tenor of the time encouraged. It was strikingly anti-employer
when employers' actions threatened industrial peace, and unusually careful
in teaching immigrants their rights and duties as well as teaching native-born
Americans their obligations to potential citizens.1
While not synonymous with ours, the times likewise undulated
with prosperity and war with its attendant boom followed by recession
and depression. In general a number of external currents influenced Americanization
during the teens and twenties: the Progressive movement with its faith
in reshaping society through state intervention; World War I and its call
for patriotism, one hundred per cent Americanism, and fear of all things
foreign, particularly German; and the Red Scare, which raised its head
with the 1917 Bolshevik victory over the Russian monarchy, intensifying
the fear of foreign influences. Each of these currents affected California
in the realm of Americanization, although not always in the way dictated
in studies of the Progressive movement or Americanization, which often
focus on New York as the trendsetter in immigrant policy of the time.
Progressive Influences
Among national debates that raged from the 19th into the 20th century
and were reignited in Congress after the assassination of President McKinley
by the son of Southeastern European immigrants was the question of whether
to exclude immigrants and if so, which ones, based on the racial thinking
of the era. A series of reforms enlarged the categories of immigrants
that were excludable. At the same time other reformers emerged to champion
what they called a domestic immigration policy and what many reformers
now refer to as immigrant policy. This policy argued that the best way
to deal with immigrant unrest was to effectively integrate new comers
into American life, educate them about their rights, and eliminate un-American
exploitation that might lead such immigrants to rebel. This domestic immigration
policy movement was adopted between the teens and twenties in five states,
which contained over half of the country's population of immigrants and
their children. In these states - New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts,
and California - reformers successfully established agencies that worked
to Americanize their residents, both immigrant and native-born, and to
eliminate the exploitation beneath immigrant unrest. Trailing New York
by a few years, California was the second state to adopt an Americanization
policy. Oriented toward cultural pluralism, it was one of the most respectful
of immigrant differences for the time.
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California received its Commission of Immigration in Housing
(CCIH) in 1913, as a result of the lobbying of a second-generation immigrant,
Simon J. Lubin, who emphasized the fact that California was likely to
receive an additional influx of Southeastern European immigrants in 1914
when the Panama Canal opened. Four departments - an Americanization department
focusing on educating immigrants in civics, a complaint department, a
migrant labor camp department, and a housing department worked together
to facilitate immigrant Americanization. Under Lubin and his fellow commissioners'
auspices, Americanization took on a unique form. Progressing from a harsher,
more racialist view under Amanda Matthews Chase, CCIH programs assumed
a softer tone under Lubin, Christina Krysto, and Ethel Richardson, even
as Americans faced increasing challenges from abroad.
As an organization CCIH perceived Americanization not
as a one way but a two way process in which both immigrants and their
native-born neighbors were expected to learn and act upon the fundamental
principals of citizenship. These principles involved learning not only
one's duties to the nation, but also one's rights; and actively working
to extend those rights to others in order to reduce destabilizing and
costly discontent. While the main beneficiaries of this program were doubtless
intended to be Southeastern Europeans, and members of the commission left
some very unpleasant remarks about Asian and Mexican Americans on the
historical register, both visual and textual evidence contradicts commonly
invoked assumptions about the state's neglectful attitude towards the
integration of Asian and Mexican American minorities. California's Americanization
program involved all of the above groups and sought to enhance the efficiency,
productivity, and harmony of the state, as well as America's image abroad.
It did so through the influence of a small state bureaucracy that engaged
a broader civil society's voluntary organizations in the service of encouraging
Americans to live up to the principles upon which the country was founded
and teach all immigrants those principles.
World War I
World War I intensified a fear that immigrants from the Axis powers, Japan
or Mexico might foment sabotage in the United States. California, carved
out of Mexico in 1848, shares a border with Mexico. This together with
concern that Germany would aid the Mexican government retake its lost
territories set Southwesterners on edge. In response to this situation
California's CCIH continued advocating a sympathetic Americanization policy,
but combined it with spying on the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW),
which led to a more repressive, yet not employer-captive policy.
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CCIH concern over IWW and a distrust of foreign laborers,
particularly Japanese and Mexicans, is reflected in its 1918 call for
the establishment of permanent community labor camps. CCIH community camp
policy appeared only in 1918, a year after American entry into the war
and came under the direct influence of a number of reports by its investigators.
One such report by J.V. Thompson aroused fear regarding the proposed German,
Japanese, and Mexican alliance. The report called for employer housing
to eliminate the congregation of certain races outside their employer's
surveillance and to limit the mobility of saboteurs. The proximity of
Japanese laborers to some of California's best beet and fruit ranches
was seen as an important threat to California's fruit industry. J.V. Thompson
noted that Japanese and Mexican laborers scattered around various California
counties "constitute[d] a menace...worthy of observance;" and Mexican
cowboys and laborers at the Miller and Lux Company near Guadalupe, had
"roundly cursed" President Woodrow Wilson when they heard that the United
States had recognized the Carranza faction in Mexico.2
Thompson suggested eliminating IWW power in a multi-fold
way. He strove to get rid of the organization's headquarters, alleviate
labor camp conditions and prevent the mobility of laborers as well as
easy access to materials for sabotage. He urged employers "to furnish
transportation, and proper accommodations to their employees" so that
they might be kept under constant surveillance.3 Additional
calls for internment fell on deaf ears. The federal government, judging
internment beyond existing legal avenues, favored a plan that relied "entirely
on legal actions...On September 5, 1917 Justice Department agents and
police officials invaded IWW homes and halls across the nation and seized
everything that they could find." Trials were held in Fresno and Sacramento,
California.4 The raids did not stop IWW organizing in agriculture,
copper mining, lumber and other industries, and CCIH sent Thompson to
investigate the Redwood Empire's lumber industry in 1918.5
CCIH efforts against IWW might suggest that CCIH was,
in fact, captive to industry during the war. Tragically IWW was one of
the few unions that offered a voice for the unskilled trades in which
immigrants tended to congregate. However, it is important to recognize
that CCIH actions during the war were aimed not against unionism, but
violence. As William Preston, the author of a history critical of the
government's repression of IWW during and immediately after WWI, points
out, it is one thing to defend civil liberties in free speech, another
"to accept the continuous violent action of the IWW's at the point of
production."6 Like the Progressives, CCIH staff and commissioners
distrusted the organized economic power of corporations. Reflecting these
two tendencies, CCIH called both for the suppression of IWW and the vigilantism
practiced by corporations by placing repression in federal hands
Beyond rhetoric, visual representations of CCIH work
suggest as much. Its labor camp department actively arrested labor camp
operators, especially as the war years waned and the incentive for employers
to follow CCIH proscriptions decreased. Inspectors were sent into the
field and a complaint department was established that encouraged immigrant
and migrant laborers to take responsibility for their own living and working
conditions ( Figure 1). The commission displayed an openness to sponsoring
Americanization classes under the auspices of any interested organization,
including the Garment Workers Union (Figure 2).
The Red Scare
While World War I raised the prospect of German, Japanese and Mexican
saboteurs, events in Russia during 1917 intensified Americans' sense of
vulnerability. That year, the Bolsheviks defeated the czars, installing
the world's first socialist government in one of the least likely places.
Insecure Americans began to see the threat of Bolshevism in labor strikes
and elsewhere. Unscrupulous opponents of Progressive reform latched onto
the general fear of the American public as a way to attack social reforms,
often successfully, parading their destruction of Progressive policies
as the triumph of Americanism. Proponents of one type of Americanism (progressive,
pluralistic) battled it out with proponents of another (conservative,
intensely nationalistic, and committed to molding all into one culture).
In this combination of World War I and Red Scare-induced battles, CCIH,
like many other Progressive era agencies and reforms, was accused of communist
sympathies as illustrated in the election campaign of California Governor
Friend W. Richardson and the allegations of the Better America Federation.
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Tension over World War I renewed conservatism in state
and national affairs and in 1919 California passed a criminal syndicalism
law. Equally symptomatic of the backlash, but more induced by the Red
Scare, was the establishment of the Better America Federation (BAF) in
May 1920. As Edwin Layton shows, this reactionary organization assaulted
Progressive legislation - from higher taxes on banks and utilities to
the open shop to the eradication of all state regulatory boards and commissions
including CCIH. BAF accused its opponents of treason and subversion, and
specifically targeted Commissioner and founder, Simon Lubin, and labor
leader and Commissioner Paul Scharrenberg. Meanwhile, the realignment
of political parties in California touted a business ideology that emphasized
corporate organization and efficiency as opposed to the social agencies'
agendas. This new administrative conservatism became institutionalized
by the 1923 election of Richardson as California's governor.7
BAF represents one of the earliest external challenges
to CCIH. As Edwin Layton notes, BAF campaigned to destroy many of the
Progressives' achievements using the same methods that Americanizers employed
during the war.8 Although CCIH ultimately discredited BAF by
exposing its private utility interest background, Lubin and Scharrenberg
were damaged by the assaults.9The militant nationalism of World
War I and the Red Scare encouraged BAF to use Americanization rhetoric
to discredit its opponents.10 For example, BAF accused Lubin
and the commission of assisting the IWW 11. It attacked Scharrenberg
for drawing money from CCIH while lobbying for anti-injunction bills that
increased labor unions' power in strikes.12 These attacks came
at a vulnerable moment in CCIH history.
Influenced by the Red Scare and the tarring of CCIH with
the taint of Communism, CCIH and the State Board of Education, whose main
Americanization program developer had been trained in CCIH, took the offensive,
promoting the need for Americanization programs for immigrants and their
extension to native-born Americans throughout California. Indeed, in this
volatile climate, CCIH actually moved considerably to the left of Liberal
Americanizers. Its proactive approach to the challenges posed by the Red
Scare was evident as early as 1919. In 1919 and 1920, a series of articles
entitled "The Strength of the Nation" co-authored by commissioner Lubin
and staff member Christina Krysto appeared in The Survey.13
These articles refuted the contemporary feeling that the melting pot was
not working, called for a federal department of nation building with bureaus
for the Americanization of both foreign-born and native-born citizens,
and reaffirmed CCIH belief that America's strength derived from its power
to take the talents of immigrants and "while preserving their national
core, to transmute them into a new thing that is essentially American."14
These articles placed novel emphasis on how the treatment
of immigrants influenced America's international image. Americans were
told that "when one section of the population is a ready victim to exploitation,
the moral tone of the whole land is lowered."15 They were warned
that the returned immigrant became an example of American life to the
homeland. "Returned emigrants corrupted by the country they have visited,
weakened by excessive labor, impoverished by adverse industrial conditions,
embittered by a series of failures," would be "a burden to the home community
and a menace to the entire homeland"16, hardly likely to project
a good image of America (Figure 3).
CCIH 1921 Annual Report argued "that Americanization was
not flag-raising and 'patriotic' howling; it was not suppression of speech
and honest opinion; it was more than teaching English to foreigners" and
involved the "Americanization" of Americans, developing national ideals
and standards in which "all residents, foreign-born as well as native-born"
would be schooled, especially through community participation.17
CCIH launched a community organization campaign in 1920 and 1921 insisting
that Americans should "be [their] own Americanizers"!18 Two
posters that appeared in its Bulletin clearly conveyed to social workers
and readers in general that instead of complaining about immigrants as
radical, unassimilated elements Americans ought to offer their services
to the state to solve the so-called problem (Figure 4). Americanization
was equated with raising all residents (whether foreign or native-born)
to a certain standard of living.
After World War I, CCIH continued to emphasize its belief
that immigrant cultures provided the best materials out of which to build
citizens. Moreover, while California's conservatives won the immediate
election, they lost the long-term battle. The slashing of CCIH budgets
by Governor Richardson was quickly reversed when the governor became inundated
by testimony about CCIH benefits to the state from women's clubs, employers,
and immigrant leaders.
Surely, in California during the teens and twenties, Americanization
was not about one hundred per cent Anglo-conformity or teaching immigrants
to accept a status quo that endangered the industrial safety, health,
and well-being of individuals and the community at large. CCIH opposition
to total Americanism influenced the State Department of Education, which
assumed responsibility for immigrant education in 1920, along with its
branch, the Bureau of Immigrant Education (BIE) in California's Department
of Adult Education. The fact that Ethel Richardson, former Director of
CCIH Bureau of Immigrant Education served on all three of these bodies,
makes clear why this occurred.19 During the late 1920s, BIE,
which furnished the most material used in immigrant education throughout
the state, resisted demands for immigrant conformity.20 A 1925
BIE Community Exchange Bulletin proclaims that the "purpose of the home
teacher...is not to encourage the alien to forget his native culture."21
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By the beginning of the Depression an uneven reversal
was underway. Those who experienced Americanization during that era, particularly
Mexican Americans, remember Americanization in a harsher mode. Asian Americans,
particularly Japanese Americans, then subject to exclusion, found themselves
subject to greater inclusion at the same time.22 The decline
in immigration and rise in native-born children who were automatically
American citizens intensified the need to educate Asian immigrants, even
though they were denied the opportunity to naturalize. CCIH classes involving
Japanese Americans suggest this shift (Figure 5).
The advent of World War II and a bifurcated policy that
incarcerated Japanese Americans while embracing Chinese and Filipino Americans
starkly interrupted CCIH activity. Americanization ultimately disappeared
as a state policy in 1945, when CCIH immigrant protective functions were
abolished. Some fifty years later the Little Hoover Commission reinvestigates
this complex precedent as one of a number of policies that might facilitate
immigrant integration in California for mutual benefit.
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